JEFFREY ALEXANDER U.C.L.A.
While Levine's reply to my essay demonstrates the broad grounding in historical considerations that we have come to expect both from him and his students, it also betrays a reluctance to grapple with the distinctively theoretical issues which were that essay's raison d'etre.
To demonstrate this failure, and to make the original theoretical points more pointed still, I will discuss briefly the two central issues that Levine raises.
(1) He argues first against my contention "that Structure established the 'base line vocabulary for modern sociology'." To refute this suggestion, Levine asks how many basic terms in modern sociology derive from Structure, referring to such "nonParsonian concepts" as mobility, network, modernization, inequality, stratification, age, and elite.
My problem here is, first, that Levine exaggerates my claim and, second, that he misses its point. I wrote in my essay (Alexander 1988 :97) that Structure played "a key role, perhaps the key role in establishing a base line vocabulary for modern sociology." I did not say, in other words, that Structure "established" the vocabulary all by itself. Second, and much more important, by "base line" vocabulary I am obviously not referring here to empiricallydirected concepts like stratification, modernization, age, or elite. To the contrary, I describe the base line issues I am concerned with as oriented to a higher level of generality, namely to "three central questions-order, action, and values." These are the issues I have called presuppositional in my work.
Recognizing the generality of these issues is critical for evaluating my claim about Structure's influence, for I rest that claim in the manner in which Parsons' formulations structured the distinctively theoretical debates in the postwar period. I suggest that these debates were structured around two conceptual issues that were distinctively formulated by Structure, The empiricism with which Levine approaches Structure is underscored in his suggestion that "one must question the success with which Structure pursued the aim . . . of 'taking stock of the theoretical resources at our disposal'." Why? Because "the effect of Structure was to exclude a number of authors who had been significant in theoretical discussions before he wrote." Again, this is not a critical response to my essay but a point that is actually central to my argument. In contrast to Levine, however, when I make this point, I do not view it as damaging to Structure's theoretical claims. In concluding this response, let me briefly suggest why.
Following postpositivist deconstruction, I suggested in my essay that if we are to understand the extraordinary impact of Structure we must set aside Parsons' own limited understanding of his own project, for it was largely rooted in a natural scientific point of view. From our present perspective, it is clear that Parsons certainly intended to exclude Simmel and Marx, among others, from his historical construction. Only in this way could he provide compelling "evidence" for his theoretical claims. But he cannot be hung on this petard. If he had not excluded these authors, he would have excluded others. All texts, whether poetic or scientific, are a combination of presences and absences; none faithfully mirror "reality" in an objective way. We investigate these absences not to disprove a text, but to find out what the text, and the author, might really mean.
This investigation is called interpretation. When we are making interpretations, moreover, we are ourselves constructing a text that is informed by our own theoretical interests. Interpretations are merely theories in a different key. That is why historicism can never replace systematic theory, even when the peculiar genre of sociological theory makes history and theory often shabbily intertwined. Structure is a work of theory, not history. Its influence, its weaknesses, its strengths cannot be demonstrated or refuted by SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY historiography. They must be confronted by theoretical reasoning itself.' ' For an extended discussion of the relation between text interpretation and theory-building in a postpositivist perspective, and a long overview of the "Parsons Debate" in these terms, see Alexander, 1989 . While I challenge Levine's historicism in this essay as well, these criticisms do not imply, of course, that Levine has not made important theoretical contributions that in fact avoid the historicist danger.
